by Matt Rej
Adyen has agreed to spend $1.2+ billion in acquisitions across two deals announced just 50 days apart from each other. Both are set to close on July 1, 2026, and they each push the company into new revenue models that sit right alongside the payments product.
For a processor that I’ve respected over the years, these moves are still worth a closer look.
And to be clear, Adyen hasn’t done anything wrong here. But it’s worth paying attention because spending large sums in this industry has historically foreshadowed changes down the road.
Adyen Acquired Talon.One and Orb
Here’s a quick summary of the acquisitions Adyen made in 2026:
- Talon.One – $876 million — German loyalty and promotions platform (announced April 23rd).
- Orb – $335 million — Usage-based billing platform based in San Francisco (announced June 11th).
- Both deals close on July 1st.
These deals represent a total of $1.2 billion in cash spent by Adyen simultaneously.
On their own, neither looks like much for a company of Adyen’s size. But together, and in context, they tell a much more interesting story that’s worth diving into.
Adyen Has Earned a Reputation for Fair Pricing
Before going any further, I want to make it clear that Adyen is a really good processor.
Among the large processors worldwide, Adyen is one of the few I’d call genuinely fair on price. Rates are low, increases are rare, and the junk fees that we find on other processor statements typically don’t exist with Adyen. When Adyen does charge for something extra, it’s usually tied to a real service that you’re actually using and benefit from.
This combination of positive attributes, honestly, is uncommon in the payments industry, and it’s a big part of why Adyen has such a great reputation.
So nothing I’m about to say is meant to imply that Adyen just flipped a switch and got greedy overnight. That’s not what happened at all. I’m just reading between the lines a bit and saying there should be a yellow caution flag out for merchants currently using Adyen, as there’s a potential for changes in the future.
Now that we’ve gotten that out of the way, let’s take a closer look at the deal and implications ahead.
Why $1.2 Billion is a Bigger Bet Than it Appears
At first glance, $1.2 billion doesn’t seem like a lot of money for a company worth around $28 billion.
Adyen’s latest full-year numbers show roughly $12.5 billion in cash on their balance sheet.
This can be a bit misleading though.
Because most of that cash isn’t Ayden’s. As a processor, Adyen is always holding money in transit. These are merchant settlement funds waiting to be paid out. According to their financials, ~$7.4 billion of that cash balance is exactly that: money owed to merchants and financial institutions (not money for Adyen to spend).
So if you strip the float out, Adyen’s own cash is closer to $5 billion. And even part of that figure needs to be set aside to back its banking licenses, meaning it isn’t freely available.
This means that Adyen didn’t spend ~10% of its cash on these acquisitions (a reasonable number), they roughly spent a quarter of their deployable cash. That’s a much larger number.
A quarter of usable cash isn’t your casual purchase. It’s the kind of bet that a company makes when they expect real returns, and they expect it to pay off quickly.
Higher Processing Rates Are the Easiest Lever to Pull
So where does that return come from?
The acquired businesses can’t deliver a positive ROI on their own. At least not very quickly.
Talon.One is expected to bring around $70 million in recurring revenue, which is obviously a lot of money. But against the $876 million acquisition price, that will take about 12 years just to earn back what Adyen paid. And that’s just measured on revenue, before any costs are factored in. Orb is a smaller company and its revenue isn’t public, but the same logic holds true.
The point I’m trying to make is this. A company sitting on several billion dollars in deployable cash has safer places to put $876 billion that would pay them back a positive return much faster. So if Adyen is willing to pay this right now, it’s betting on something bigger than what these companies earn today.
The simplest approach to get back hundreds of millions is through rate increases. This is what has historically happened across the payments industry when processors make such large acquisitions.
It doesn’t take much. A few basis points across a merchant base of Adyen’s size adds up quickly.
To be crystal clear, I’m not saying Adyen has done this or plans to do so. I’m just saying it’s the easiest option at their disposal, and for a company that just spent a quarter of its usable cash has a good reason to use it. Especially since most businesses haven’t experienced rate increases from Adyen over the last several years. It feels like they’re due for one.
Both Acquisitions Are Value-Added Services
The second path is the one I’d watch most closely, because two companies Adyen bought have the same thing in common. Look at what these businesses actually do.
Talon.One runs loyalty, promotions, and real-time offers. And Orb handles usage-based billing and invoicing. Take away the two brand names, and you’ve got two new value-added services: products a processor sells on top of its basic payment processing.
Interestingly enough, I just published an article breaking down how value-added services have quietly become the fastest-growing fees in payments.
Every major network and processor has been telling investors the same story. Their growth is coming from VAS, and they’re looking for new ways to push it.
Adyen’s two new acquisitions cleanly fit the same pattern. Adyen now owns a loyalty engine and billing platform that it can cross-sell to merchants who already trust the brand.
Some of that may be worth it, as these solutions can solve real problems for certain businesses. But it’s the exact dynamic that we warn businesses about. Once your processor starts running your loyalty program, billing, and other VAS, your total cost with that vendor climbs, walking away becomes harder, and you lose leverage.
Your base rate can hold steady for years, but your effective rate continues to rise.
What This Means for Adyen Merchants Right Now
Nothing has changed quite yet. And I’m not sounding any alarms.
Ayden hasn’t raised rates, announced new fees, and hasn’t given anyone a reason to panic.
Unlike many other processors out there, Adyen has earned the right to get the benefit of the doubt here. So there’s a real chance they’ll keep pricing tactics the same way that they always have: honest and fair.
But there’s a lot of money at stake here, and I’ll continue to keep my eye on this. You should too.
Pull your last few statements and work out your effective rate, then continue to track it over the next few quarters to see if anything changes. Especially if Adyen starts pitching you on loyalty tools, billing add-ons, or anything that wasn’t part of your initial setup. These types of services are only worth paying for if you’d actually buy them on your own. So don’t fall for any sales tricks when your phone rings or you get an appealing email offer.
If you’d like a second set of eyes on things, my team can audit your statements for exactly this type of rate creep. The first audit is free, and there’s no switching required.